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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The portion of this case on appeal involves a claim to quiet title to real property by 
Appellees Jerry Losee and JoCarol Losee ("the Losees"). This appeal is taken from an order for 
partial summary judgment entered November 19, 2007 by the Sixth District Conrt, Bannock 
County, Idaho, in favor of the Losees, reconsideration of which was denied on December 19, 
2007. 
B. Statement of the Facts 
Sky Enterprises, LLC ("Sky") is an Idaho limited liability company, organized in 
September, 2003. The initial management board of Sky consisted of the Losees, William F. 
Rigby ("Rigby") and Ronald R. Warnecke ("Warnecke"). Defendant/Appellant The Idaho 
Company ("Idaho Company") is an Idaho Business and Industrial Development Corporation, and 
a 50% equity owner and member of Sky; the remaining 50% of Sky is owned by the Losees. 
The business relationship between the Losees and Idaho Company began in 
approximately August 2003 when JoCarol Losee approached Idaho Company President William 
F. Rigby regarding financing for the Rite-Back device, an invention which the Losees were 
attempting to manufacture and market. On September 23, 2003, a Membership Interest Purchase 
Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") was executed between the Losees and Idaho Company. 1 On 
that same date, a document titled Operating Agreement of Sky Enterprise, L.L. C. ("Operating 
1R., Vol. I, pp. 81-95. 
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Agreement") was signed both by the Losees and Idaho Company.2 The Purchase Agreement and 
the Operating Agreement provided that Idaho Company would receive 50% interest in Sky and 
the Losees would retain a 50% interest in the company. The Purchase Agreement required Idaho 
Company to make some capital ·contribution to Sky but provided that Idaho Company could 
satisfy this obligation by arranging for Sky to receive $135,000 in financing or as a line of credit, 
as set forth in the Purchase Agreement, Section 2. 3 
From September 23, 2003 to March 2004, the Losees were responsible for all accounting 
functions and for management of Sky. During this time, the Losees spent Sky money .on items 
not in the budget and for non-business-related expenses, to the financial detriment of Sky. In 
March 2004, Idaho Company requested a review of the financial statements and accounting 
procedures because reports were not being prepared and provided for review to the Sky 
management board by the Losees as required by the Operating Agreement. The review was 
conducted by Hal Latin and Daryl Snyder. They found significant and material failures and Mr. 
Latin made a written report to Idaho Company.4 Shortly after this review, Idaho Company took 
over all accounting and all major check writing functions, hiring Ms. Snyder to head this effort. 
During this time frame, the Losees asserted that they needed another infusion of capital to 
complete the constrnction of the Sky manufacturing facility and get Sky set up for full scale 
manufacturing of the device. Instead of seeking a business loan from a third-party lender, the 
2R., Vol. I, pp. 34-78, specifically p. 76. 
3R., Vol. I, p. 81. 
4R., Supp., pp. 32-33. 
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Losees asked Idaho Company to increase the loan to Sky to $261,000. In exchange, they agreed 
to pledge their real property, a residential home located in Bannock county at 9253 Frandsen 
Road, Lava Hot Springs, Idaho (the "Lava Home"). 5 The Lava Home was the primary residence 
of the Losees; it was also the site of the manufacturing facility constructed with loan proceeds. 
The loan of$261,000 was granted by Idaho Company on July I, 2004 to the Losees and 
also to Sky jointly and individually, and the Losees execnted a Promissory Note 6, Deed of Trust 
on the Lava Home,7 and Pledge ofSecurity8 on July I, 2004 in favor ofidaho Company as 
grantor of the loan. As is typical of secured lenders, Idaho Company recorded the Deed of Trust 
on the Lava Home, as provided by Idaho law.9 
Sky began manufacturing the Rite-Back, and Losees hired employees to support them in 
that effort. Shortly thereafter, it came to the attention ofidaho Company that the Losees had 
hired an employee under the age of 16, as well as the Losees' 13-year-old daughter. Idaho 
Company informed the Losees that Idaho law prohibited their hiring employees under age 16 to 
work in a manufacturing operation; however, within a month thereafter, the Losees hired a 15-
year-old nephew. 10 
As Snyder began working on the Sky books and records, it became apparent to her that 
some invoices and/or receipts were missing, and that there were charges and debits for which the 
5 R., Supp., pp. 19-22. 
6 R., Supp., pp. 23-24. 
7 R., Supp., pp. I 9-22. 
8 R., Supp., pp. 26-30. 
9 R., Supp., p. 14. 
'°R., Supp., p. 86, II. 17-24. 
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Losees had not provided supporting docwnentation. Snyder repeatedly asked the Losees for the 
missing documents, and to support their contention that the charges were legitimate business 
expenses. The Losees failed and refused to provide any documentation. Ultimately, Snyder 
conducted her own investigation regarding some of the charges and came to the conclusion they 
were not business expenses. She learned, for instance, that a $1,000 payment debited as "Maple 
Street" was in fact to "Maple Street Sit and Sleep" for the purchase of bedroom furniture for the 
Losees' personal use. 11 
The business relationship between the Losees and Idal10 Company continued to 
deteriorate, due to the Losees' misuse of company funds, failure to keep records, failure to 
properly account for company funds, and other violations of the Operating Agreement and the 
Losees' employment agreements with Sky. The funds Idaho Company committed to Sky were 
exhausted. Sky was not earning any appreciable revenue. Several telephone conferences and in-
person meetings were held in an attempt to address the problems; however, the Losees continued 
to be unresponsive and uncooperative. On August 29, 2004, the Losees sent a letter to Rigby and 
Warnecke stating, among other things, that they were opening a new bank account for Sky under 
the Lo sees' exclusive control, and that they intended to "run this business on their own." 12 
Lo sees did, in fact, open a new bank account, into which they deposited company funds. 13 They 
"R., Supp., p. 92,119. 
12R., Supp., p. 14, ~ 16, p. 35. 
13R., Supp., p. 76, II. 7-25, p. 77, II. 1-17. 
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utilized those fimds for their personal expenses. 14 On September 3, 2004 the Losees were 
informed that Idaho Company would advance no further funds. 15 
Idaho Company sent a letter to the Losees, again informing them that Idaho Company 
would not advance any additional funds for Sky's operation, including salaries. 16 By this time, 
Idaho Company had advanced $271,058.02. 17 Idaho Company also invoked the mediation 
clause of the Operating Agreement, and requested the Losees participate in mediation as required 
by that agreement. 18 A mediation was conducted on Friday, September 17, 2004 under the 
auspices of Marvin M. Smith as mediator. An agreement was reached, wherein Losees had until 
Friday, September 24, 2004 to arrange a buy-out ofidaho Company interest in Sky. 19 
The Losees failed to arrange a buy-out. On October 11, 2004, a special meeting of the 
board was held. Notice was duly provided to the Losees, but they failed to attend.20 At the 
special meeting, the Sky management board resolved to move operations from Lava Hot Springs, 
Idaho to Idaho Falls, Idaho. 
On or about October 13, 2004, Sky filed a Verified Complaint for Claim and Delivery in 
the Sixth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, Bannock County Case No. CV-04-4501 
OC. A Temporary Restraining Order was entered on or about October 15, 2004 in said action, 
14R., Supp., p. 78, II. 2-23; pp. 87-88. 
15 s R., Upp., p. 14, 1[ 17. 
16R., Supp., p. 14, ,r 18, pp. 37-38. 
17R., Supp., p. 14, 1[ 19, p. 40. 
18R., Supp., p. 14, 1[ 18, pp. 37-38 
19R., Supp., p. 15, 1[ 21, pp. 42-44. 
20R., Supp., p. 15, 1[23, p. 45. 
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I 
restraining the Losees from interfering with the physical facility and operation of Sky. At a 
subsequent hearing held October 27, 2004, a stipulation was reached between the parties. The 
parties agreed (I) to dissolve the temporary restraining order; (2) to conduct a joint inventory of 
Sky assets; (3) that the management board of Sky would consist of the Lo sees, Rigby and 
Warnecke, and that a fifth member of said board would be jointly selected; (4) that a new bank 
account would be opened at Ireland Bank for Sky, into which all business proceeds from sales or 
any other source would be deposited; (5) that no money would be withdrawn from said account 
except by agreement of counsel; ( 6) that each party would inform the other before accessing the 
premises for any reason; and (7) the parties would keep each other fully informed of sales efforts 
and the results of said efforts. The District Court approved the stipulation, and entered an Order 
requiring the parties to abide by its terms.21 
The Losees failed to comply with the terms of the stipulation and order, and on January 
24, 2005 the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directed toward the Losees. A show cause 
hearing was held February 1, 2005. At the hearing, JoCarol Losee admitted that since the entry 
of the order she had withheld sales documentation from her own attorneys and from Idaho 
Company and that she had converted Sky funds to her own personal use. 22 Finding that the 
Losees had violated the previous stipulation and order, the Court granted immediate possession 
of all Sky assets to Sky, to be managed by Idaho Company. The Losees were prohibited from 
21 R., Supp., pp. I 16-120. 
n 6 
··-R., Supp., pp. 124-12 . 
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!. 
' I 
I 
entering the Sky premises.23 Thereafter on March 1, 2005, the court entered an order permitting 
Idaho Company to move Sky property from Lava to Idaho Falls.24 
C. Course of the Proceediugs Below 
In February 2006, approximately one year after the management of Sky was vested solely 
in Idaho Company, the Losees filed a new action in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial 
District, Bannock County, CV-06-908, which contained myriad claims. The Losees asserted 
everything from sexual harassment of Mrs. Losee to nonpayment of wages and breach of good 
faith. 25 Among the claims was the claim for quiet title against Idaho Company, which forms the 
basis of this appeal. Idaho Company and Rigby answered the Losees' complaint, and filed a 
counterclaim alleging counts of mismanagement, conversion, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and violation of previous court orders in the earlier action.26 
On February 22, 2007, the Lo sees filed a motion for partial sunnnary judgment, seeking 
to quiet title in the Lava Home and set aside the Deed of Trust held by Idaho Company on the 
property. The motion was heard on November 15, 2007, and on November 19, 2007 District 
Judge Peter McDermott entered his Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment, 
certifying said order for immediate appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(b).27 Thereafter, Appellants 
23R., Supp., pp. 127-128, pp. 130-134. 
2
''R., Supp., pp. 136-138. 
25 It should be noted that nowhere in the complaint did either of the Losees assezt fraud against Idaho 
Company, neither did they claim that their signatures on all of the pertinent documents were obtained by fraud. 
26R., Vol. II, pp. 277-292. 
27R., Vol. II, pp. 296-297. 
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moved for reconsideration, which was denied on December 19, 2007. Appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal on December 24, 2007. 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the Appellees, as moving party, meet the initial burden of establishing the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact? 
B. Did the record before the District Court contain conflicting material facts which 
would lead reasonable persons to differing conclusions? 
C. Did the District Court fail to construe disputed facts in favor of the non-moving 
party? 
D. Did the District Court commit errors of law in granting partial summary judgment 
to Appellees? 
E. Did the District Court fail to support its judgment with findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw? 
F. Should Appellants be awarded their attorneys fees and costs incurred herein? 
V. ARGUMENT 
Entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 28 In 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, when there is evidence concerning 
material issues in conflict, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable inferences from 
28 I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
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the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary judgment 
motionc29 On appeal, this Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of 
material fact exists and whether the moving party was and is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.30 
A. Appellees Failed to Meet Their Burden 
The burden of proving the absence of material factual issues is upon the party moving for 
summary judgment, 31 in this case, the Lo sees. They were required to show that there was no 
factual dispute about the nature of the transfer of the $135,000 to Sky, about the loan increase to 
$261,000 or about the events surrounding the formation and purpose of the Deed of Trust. But 
the Losees did not meet this burden. Indeed, they provided no statement of undisputed facts to 
the district court in their Memorandwn in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,32 
nor did they do so in any other filing. Rather, the record shows that on each of these points, the 
Losees relied exclusively on the affidavit of JoCarol Losee in support of their claims. However, 
the testimony in Mrs. Losee's affidavit is directly contradicted by her prior sworn testimony in 
the previous litigation between the parties. Regarding the initial contribution of$135,000, Mrs. 
Losee testified: 
29 Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008). 
Land O'Lakes v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817,819, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App 2003). 
30 Ada County v. Fuhrman, 140 Idaho 230,232, 91 P.3d l 134, 1136 (2004). 
31 Id. 
32 R, Vol. l, pp. 191-194. 
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JO CAROL LOSEE: Well, it crune to our, when we first went into this together, 
it was to our understanding that a hundred and thirty five thousand dollars, we 
understood, was going to be given to us right up front. 
MILLER: Uh-huh. 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Which it was not. We only got little bits here and there. 
MILLER: Okay, stop there, if you would. What was the Idaho Company going to 
get in return for that hundred and thirty-five thousand, the initial-
JO CAROL LOSEE: Fifty percent. 
MILLER: Fifty percent of Sky Enterprise? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.33 
* * * 
MILLER: When did you signed (sic) that? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: We signed it, it was either January or February. 
MILLER: Okay, now if you would turn to section, you don't even have to turn, 
section two of that membership interest and purchase agreement. Could you read 
the last sentence? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: It is understood that the investor's capital contribution may 
be in the form of assistance with obtaining the operating credit line for Sky 
Enterprise, LLC. 
MILLER: Okay. Now was that your understanding at the time you signed this? 
Because you testified that the hundred and thirty-five thousand was to purchase a 
membership interest, correct? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: It was. 
MILLER: Okay. Did you understand that those funds would have to be repaid to 
the Idaho Company? 
33R., Supp., pp. 69-70, IL 21-12. 
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JO CAROL LOSEE: Exactly. 
MILLER: Okay. So with that initial hundred and thirty-five, it is your testimony, 
was in the form of a loan that would have to be repaid? 
JO CAR0L LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: And it was also a purchase of an equity interest in Sky Enterprise? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes, but we never received-34 
* * * 
MILLER: Okay. It was your testimony earlier than when you first got the 
advance of a hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars, it was your understanding 
it would get the joint venture, L.L.C., they'd take a fifty percent interest. 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. But I didn't get the whole money up front. 
MILLER: I appreciate that. You didn't get the whole money up front, but it was 
your understanding, they were getting a fifty percent equity stake in the business? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yeah. 
MILLER: Okay. They would have necessarily gotten fifty percent of the profits, 
too, right? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: That would have came out of their, yeah, the distributions 
after the loan was paid off. 35 
The testimony of JoCarol Losee, given under oath in prior legal proceedings, establishes 
that the Losees understood the form by which Idaho Company would purchase its 50% equity 
interest in Sky. In addition, the Losees received the benefit of their bargain with Idaho 
Company. There is no dispute that Sky received the $135,000 initial operating line and spent the 
34R., Supp., pp. 72-73, II. 8-25, 1-9. 
35R., Supp., p. 89, II. 6-22. 
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whole of it; nor is there any dispute that those funds were expended during the time the Losees 
were in charge of Sky operations and financial matters. 
Regarding formation of the Deed of Trust, Mrs. Losee testified: 
MILLER: Okay. There came a time when a hundred and thirty-five thousand 
wasn't enough, is that correct? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: Why? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Becanse the molds were delayed for producing them. 
MILLER: Did the Idaho Company advance you further funds? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: From the initial hundred and thirty-five thousand dollars, were you able 
to build the facility next to your house, the production facility? Was it done by 
the time those funds were expired? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: I don't know, because I didn't have track of how much had 
been put into there. They had the running total of how much was all put in. 
MILLER: Okay. 
JO CAROL LOSEE: And it took more because of the cost of lumber that had 
gone up and the price of building the facility, too. 
MILLER: Okay. So it came to be an expensive facility? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: And the Idaho Company advanced funds to Sky to pay for that facility? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.36 
36R., Supp., pp. 83-85. 
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* * * 
MILLER: Now let's turn to the deed of trust that I handed you, which I believe 
is B. Do you recall signing that document? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: And what was the date you signed that? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: July first, 2004. 
MILLER: Also the date of the promissory note? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 37 
* * * 
MILLER: Would you represent that this deed of trust is one of the things the 
Idaho Company could have looked at for repayment of that two hundred and sixty 
thousand dollar obligation? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.38 
* * * 
MILLER: You granted your house as security for the loan from the Idaho 
Company, is that correct? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes. 
MILLER: And you executed a deed of trust in favor of the Idaho Company, so the 
Idaho Company could foreclose on your home, if needed, to collect this debt, 
correct? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Okay.39 
37R., Supp., p. 73, II. 11-19. 
38R., Supp., p. 74, II. 4-8. 
39R., Supp, p. 74, IL 18-25. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 13 
* * * 
MILLER: O!G1y. Would it be your belief that the Idaho Company could look to 
your house as security as an alternate means of collecting that debt? 
JO CAROL LOSEE: Yes.40 
Idaho law does not perrn,it a party to contradict by affidavit previous sworn testimony 
within a summary judgment context.41 The affidavit filed by JoCarol Losee in support of 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment contradicts her previous sworn testimony, and should 
have been disregarded by the district court. 
The Deed ofTrust,42 Promissory Note,43 Pledge of Security,44 ledger of disbursal of funds 
to Sky, 45 and Rigby' s sworn affidavit testimony also challenged the Lo sees' assertion that they 
were not aware that they were making a secured loan, 46 that they did not authorize a loan to 
Sky,47 and that they did not pledge the Lava Home for purposes of a secured loan.48 The 
Appellees did not meet their burden, and partial snmrnary judgment should not have been 
granted. 
40R., Supp., p. 75, II. 11-14. 
41 Tolmie Farms v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 124 Idaho 607,610,862 P.2d 299,302 (1993); Keeven v. Estate of 
Keeven (in Re Estate of Keeven), 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457, 465 (Ct. App. 1994). 
2005. 
42 R., Supp., pp. 19-22. 
43 R., Supp., pp. 23-24. 
44 R., Supp., pp. 26-30. 
45 R., Supp., p. 40. Proof of loan payments on a $261,000 loan origination amount from July 2004 to June 
46 R., Vol. !I, p. 197. 
47 R., Vol. II, p. 197. 
48 R., Vol. n, p. 198. 
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B. The Record Before the District Court Contained Conflicting Material Facts 
This Court has previously held that motions for summary judgment should be granted 
with caution,49 and only in the narrowest of circumstances where the record before the trial court 
contains no conflicting facts or inferences from which reasonable minds rnight reach different 
conclusions. so Further, where there is ambiguity, such as in meaning of terms of a contract, the 
ambiguity creates an issue of fact, which must preclude summary judgment.51 
In this case, the facts presented to the trial court could have led reasonable people to 
different conclusions. Regarding the issue of whether Idaho Company satisfied its consideration 
obligation under the contract, the Losees asserted, through Mrs. Losees' affidavit, that pursuant 
to Schedule I of the Operating Agreement, Idaho Company was to contribute $135,000 in cash. 52 
Mrs. Losee further alleged that Idaho Company never paid the $135,000. Idaho Company, 
through the affidavit of Rigby, averred that Idaho Company did satisfy its capital contribution 
obligation to Sky. Rigby provided proof that Idaho Company had arranged for a line of credit in 
the amount of $135,000 for Sky, satisfying the requirements of Section 2 of the Purchase 
Agreement. Rigby testified that Idaho Company was not required to contribute actual cash, as 
the Purchase Agreement clearly provided that the "capital contribution" could take the form of 
"assistance with obtaining an operating credit line for Sky Enterprises, LLC" which did occur. 53 
49 Bonz v.Sudweeks,119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). 
5° Kline v. Clinton 103 Idaho l 16, 645 P.2d 3 50 ( 1982). 
51 Johannsen v. Utterbeck_ P.3d ~ 2008 WL 4595248 at 3 (2008). 
52 R, Vol. II, p. 196, p. 249. 
53 R., Supp., p. 13. 
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In previous sworn testimony set forth supra, Mrs. Losee admitted the $135,000 was received and 
expended, and further admitted she understood the capital contribution could be in the form of a 
line of credit. This previous testimony directly contradicted her affidavit. 
The Losees also asserted that the $261,000 loan was not "authorized" by them, should not 
be considered a loan and did not provide a valid basis for the issuance of the Deed of Trust. Mrs. 
Losee stated in her affidavit "the Defendants have also provided us with another 
document. .. [w]e are not sure what this document is supposed to reflect - but it does show a 
nUQ1ber of 'loans' begi1ming July 7, 2004, and continuing thereafter. At no time did my hnsband 
and I authorize loans to Sky Enterprises."54 Mrs. Losee also testified in her affidavit that she had 
not intended to be involved in a loan and that she believed that the increased funding to Sky was 
an investment or an "at risk investment," rather than a Ioan.55 This is in direct contradiction to 
Rigby' s affidavit and Mrs. Losee' s previous testimony. Rigby testified that the Losees asked 
Idaho Company to provide a loan in the sum of $261,000 and that in consideration for said loan 
the Losees executed a Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in favor ofidaho Company on July I, 
2004.56 A copy of the Promissory Note signed by both of the Losees was attached to Rigby's 
affidavit and contained the following designations: 
Debtor's Name: Sky Enterprises, LLC, Jerry Lee Losee, JoCarol Losee 
Secured Party's Name: The Idaho Company 
54 R., Vol. II, p. 197, 1 8. It should be noted that the exhibit attached to Mrs. Losee's affidavit is not the 
balance sheet to which she refers to in the body of her affidavit but is a copy of the Promissory Note signed by the 
Losees. It appears that the error occurred in the original and the district court did not receive this document as a part 
of the affidavit of Mrs. Losee. 
55 R., Vol. II, p. 197. 
56 R., Supp., p. 13, 1114-6. 
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. 
Loan No. 007; Date: July 1, 2004; Amount: $261,000.00; Maturity: July 1, 2005; Loan 
Fee: $0.0057 
The Promissory Note also contained the following language: 
SKY ENTERPRISES ... JERRY LEE LOSEE, and JOCAROL LOSEE, after date without 
grace for valued receiveµ, I, we, or either ofus promise to pay to the order of THE 
IDAHO COMPANY ... TWO HUNDRED SIXTY_ ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS AND 
00/100 ... " 
The Promissory Note and Pledge of Security attached to Mr. Rigby' s affidavit contains clear 
indicia of a loan using the terms - 'Debtor', 'Secured Party', 'Secured Debt', and 'Security 
Interest' on the face of the documents. 58 Rigby's testimony and evidence provides grounds upon 
which reasonable persons could conclude that Idaho Company had granted a loan to Sky and the 
Losees for $261,000. In addition, Mrs. Losee's previous sworn testimony, cited supra, 
contradicts her affidavit and confirms that the Losees signed the loan documents, were aware 
that they were personally liable for the loan, and knew that the Lava Home had been pledged as 
security for that loan. 
Mrs. Losee asserts that her "understanding" of the agreement between Idaho Company 
and the Losees was that Idaho Company would supply all the "operating capital necessary to 
operate the company [Sky]. .. "59 Rigby points to both the Purchase Agreement and the three 
documents60 signed by both of the Losees which contain no such provisions. In its 
57 R., Supp., p. 23. 
58 R., Supp., pp. 23-30. 
59 R., Vol. n, p. 199. 
60 Promissory Note, Deed of Trust and Pledge of Security. 
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Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 61 Appellants 
clearly delineated disputed facts precluding summary judgment. 62 Appellants further brought 
disputed facts to the attention of the trial court in their Brief in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment or, in the Alternative, for Reconsideration.63 However, the district 
court failed to adequately consider the disputed facts. 
It is not appropriate for a trial court, sitting in summary judgment, to malce factual 
determinations where facts are in conflict. Likewise, the trial court is not to weigh the evidence. 
Rather, the trial court's duty is to determine whether or not there exists any genuine issue of 
material fact as adduced from the entire record. 64 In Kline, the parties had contracted for the 
purchase of a large livestock ranch. The conflict arose because two different written contracts 
had been drafted for the purchase of the ranch, and the parties never entered into a final written · 
agreement. 65 The plaintiff-purchasers urged the trial court to interpret the final contract to be one 
which included oral modifications allegedly reached about four months after the initial written 
contract had been drafted. Defendants claimed that the version advocated by the plaintiff-
purchasers was not correct because there had been no full agreement to oral modification and 
certain key terms which the plaintiffs asserted were in the final contract had not been defined. 
61 R., Supp., pp. 46-138. 
62 R., Supp., pp. 52-55. 
6) R., Supp., pp. 141-151. 
64 Kline, 103 Idaho at 121,645 P.2d at 355. 
65 Kline, 103 Idaho at l 19,645 P.2d at 353. 
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The plaintiffs sought recision of the contract and also a foreclosure of a purchaser's lien, which 
had been filed against the ranch. 66 
The evidence presented to the trial court at the time of summary judgment was unclear 
and provided two opposing inferences. The defendants asserted in sworn affidavits that there 
had been no oral modification to the contract and pointed out to the court that there was no 
evidence that certain payments had been made by plaintiffs which would be indicia of the oral 
modifications plaintiffs asserted had occurred. In contrast, the plaintiffs presented deposition 
testimony, which provided there had b_een oral modifications and pointed to the fact that the 
defendant had obtained financing, which they alleged supported one of the oral modifications.67 
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court stated that there was no showing 
of a meeting of the minds to form a contract and that the plaintiffs had been required to show by 
clear and convincing evidence the terms of any oral agreement, which they were unable to do. 68 
The trial court then granted summary judgment and ordered that the purchaser's lien and lis 
pendens filed by the plaintiffs be expunged. 69 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that while the trial court had applied the correct 
standard of clear and convincing evidence to prove an oral modification, at the summary 
judgment stage, the fi.mction of the trial court was not to weigh the evidence or to try the factual 
66 Kline, I 03 Idaho at 1 I 9, 645 P.2d at 353. 
67 Id. at 121, 355. 
68 Id 
69 Id at 120,354. 
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issues at all, regardle~s of standard. 70 The appellate Court found there were genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether the written contracts were orally modified creating an 
enforceable agreement. In the Court's view, reasonable minds could have differed on the 
accuracy of the testimony preseµted by plaintiffs and that asserted by defendants thus making 
entry of summary judgment inappropriate. 71 
In the case at bar, the district judge was faced with a situation where conflicting facts and 
inferences were before the court through testimony and evidence presented by both parties. The 
judge could not have reached a determination that the Deed of Trust was null and void without 
making an underlying factual determination regarding the conflicting evidence before him. Such 
a determination is appropriate only at trial before the finder of fact; even where the finder of fact 
is the trial judge himself, he must wait until trial to malce determinations on disputed evidentiary 
facts. The district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the Losees. 
C. The District Court Failed to Construe Disputed Facts in Favor of the Non-
moving Party 
In making the determination as to whether summary judgment is appropriate, when 
evidence on material issues is in conflict, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable 
inferences from the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
summary judgment motion.72 In this case, the ruling from the district court does not provide 
7° Kline, l03 Idaho at l2l, 645 P.2d at 355. 
71 Id 
71 Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd Partnership, l45 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008); 
Land O'Lakes v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817, 8 l 9, 69 P.3d 1078, 1080 (Ct. App 2003). 
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much insight into ho~ the district court construed disputed facts because the court failed to make 
findings of fact or conclusions of law. It can only be inferred from the end result that the district 
court failed to construe disputed facts in favor of the Appellants. 
The district court dissolved the deed ohrust, holding it was null and void. This indicates 
that the district court either found that I) there was no loan given to the Losees for $26 I ,000 as 
consideration for the Deed of Trust; or 2) that the Losees should not be held personally liable for 
the loan because the Operating Agreement did not permit such security or liability for 
indebtedness. If the finding was the former, it flies in the face of the plai11 meaning of the 
documentary evidence presented by the Appellants. The Appellants provided copies of the 
document signed by the Losees titled "Promissory Note" which evidenced a loan amount of 
$261,000, and which on its face designated Sky and the Losees as "Debtors" and provided that 
both Sky and the Losees "promised to pay" to Idaho Company $261,000 at 4% interest.73 The 
Losees also executed a document titled "Pledge of Security" which secured a debt of $261,000 74 
and a "Deed of Trust" which secured a principal obligation limit of $261,000.75 These three 
documents clearly evidence a loan by Idaho Company to the Losees and Sky for $261,000, 
secured by a Deed of Trust in the Lava Home and a secured interest in the accounts receivable, 
equipment, and inventory of Sky. In the absence of ambiguity, the documents must be construed 
in their plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the wording of 
73 R., Supp., pp. 23-24. 
74 R., Supp., pp. 26-30. 
75 R., Supp., pp. 19-22. 
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the instruments.76 The plain language of these three documents can only be construed to indicate 
they are instruments to create a secured debt. 
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, incorporated into Idaho law, a lender 
is permitted to take a security interest in property or collateral of a debtor after value is granted to 
a debtor. 77 Idaho Company was entitled to ask for collateral to secure the loan of $261,000 if it 
provided value to Sky and the Losees. There is evidence in the loan ledger that such value was 
provided over a period of time from July 2004 to June 2005. 78 The evidence also indicates that 
the Losees were well aware that they were taking on personal indebtedness through the J\1ly 
2004 loan. The Promissory Note, which Mr. and Mrs. Losee personally signed, delineates on its 
face that Sky, Mrs. Losee, and Mr. Losee are joint co-debtors. It provides" 'I,' 'we,' 'me,' 'my,' 
or 'us' means each Debtor who signs" and "Sky Enterprises ... Jerry Lee Losee, and JoCarol 
Losee ... for value received, I, we, or either o(us promise to pay to the order of the Idaho 
Company ... $261,000 ... with interest thereon." 79 Fnrther, it should be noted on the signature 
page of the Promissory Note and Pledge of Security, Jerry Losee signed twice - once in his 
representational capacity for Sky and once as an individual. The Promissory Note gives clear 
indicia that the Losees signed the loan for $261,000 personally, as individuals, and that both the 
Losees and Sky intended to indebt themselves individually and jointly for the loan of $261,000. 
Further proof that Mrs. Losee understood the nature of this transaction for the 261,000 loan and 
76 Chavez v. Barrus 146 Idaho 212,219, 192 P.3d 1036, 1043 (2008). 
77 l.C. § 28-9-203. 
78 R., Vol. r, pp. 143-146. 
79 R., Supp., p. 23. 
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pledge of security of the Lava Home is found in the testimony of Mrs. Losee in the 2004 
litigation where she said, under oath, that she was well aware that she, in signing the Deed of 
Trust, had granted her house as security for the loan of $261,000 loan and that Idaho Company 
could foreclose upon the home, Jf needed, to collect upon the debt. 80 
If the district court believed that the Deed of Trust was invalid because the language of 
Operating Agreement did not permit such indebtedness, this also would be an error. The 
Operating Agreement, at Sections 4.2 and 6.15 provides as follows: 
4.2 Each Member's liability shall be limited as set fotih in this 
Agreement, the Act, and other applicable law. In addition, all debts, obligations 
and liabilities of the Company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise shall 
be solely the debts obligations and liabilities of the Company and, unless 
otherwise provided in the Act, no Member shall be obligated personally for any 
such debt obligation or liability solely by reason of being a Member. 81 
6 .15 Except as may be otherwise provided by the Act of this 
Agreement, no Board Member shall be (i) personally liable for the debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the Company, including any such debts, obligations or 
liabilities arising under a judgment decree or order of a court, (ii) obligated to 
cure any deficit in any Capital Account; (iii) required to return all or any po1iion 
of any Capital Contribution; or (iv) required to lend any funds to the Company. 82 
The plain meaning of 6.15 shows that the Operating Agreement intended to shield the 
Members of Sky from personal liability relating only to the operations or operational 
indebtedness of Sky. For example, if Sky became indebted for the purchase of materials to build 
a widget, to purchase large quantities of office paper, or to procure building supplies to complete 
'
0 R., Supp., pp. 73-75. 
81 R., pp. 38-39. 
82 R., pp. 44-45. 
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the manufacturing facility, the same would be the sole debt of Sky. Additionally, if a judgment 
was entered against Sky in the context of a breach of contract suit, the same wonld not be the 
liability of the Members. However, the plain language of 6.15 does not shield the Members if 
they voluntarily take on debt for investment into Sky, such as capital contributions. For 
example, if the Losees had personally sought a loan from a third-party lender, that lender would 
not simply look toward Sky for security and repayment on the loan where the Losees were co-
debtors. The lender could be limited to seeking repayment from the company where it had only 
loaned directly to the company, but where the borrowers or debtors included the Losees jointly 
and individually, the debt became their joint and severable responsibility. 
For purposes of summary judgment, the Operating Agreement should have been 
construed in favor of the Appellants. Failure to do so was an error on the part of the district 
court. 
D. The District Court Committed Errors of Law in Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment to Appellees 
1. Quasi-estoppel. 
The entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 83 Even if 
the trial court in this matter had found that there was a lack of genuine issues of material fact, the 
831.R.C.P. 56(c). 
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court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Idaho Company was not entitled to a Deed of Trust 
executed by the Losees and that the Losees could not be held personally liable as a matter of law. 
The Losees' claim for quiet title should have failed at the outset because Mrs. Losee 
testified in the previous litigation that she knew that the Lava Home was being used as collateral 
for the $261,00 loan and that Idaho Company could look to the Lava Home for security as an 
alternate means of collecting its debt. Contradicting that testimony in the present case, Mrs. 
Losee asserts that "[n]either my husband nor I understood that our execution of these documents 
[Promissory Note and Deed of Trust] would amount to a lien against our home and real 
property. "84 
The Losees' claims underlying the motion for summary judgment and the claim for quiet 
title should have been barred under a theory of quasi-estoppel. Quasi-estoppel is properly 
invoked against a person asserting a claim inconsistent with a position previously taken by that 
person with lmowledge of the facts and his or her rights, to the detriment of the person seeldng 
application of the doctrine. 85 Quasi-estoppel prevents a party from reaping an unconscionable 
advantage, or from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing 
positions.86 In this case, Mrs. Losee testified in 2004 that she knew of the nature of the Deed of 
Trust and of the loan87 and that she had granted her home as security for the loan from the Idaho 
84 R., Vol. II, p. 199,114. 
85 The Highlands, Inc. v. Hosac. 130 Idaho 67, 70 936 P.2d 1309, 1312 (1997). 
86 Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003). 
87 R., Supp., pp. 73-74. 
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Company, yet she and Mr. Losee took the opposite stance in this current case filed in 2006. 88 
The Losees' change of position from 2004 has damaged Idaho Company. Not only has it 
resulted in this protracted litigation which has cost the company time and money to defend, but it 
also led to the dissolution ofthe_Deed of Trust which was the Idaho Company's collateral for the 
loan of $261,000. The trial court should not have permitted the Losees to take a position in this 
matter contrary to the Losees' 2004 position in either bringing this suit or in granting summary 
judgment on the matter of quiet title. 
2. Paro! evidence. 
The rule against parol evidence provides that if a written agreement is complete upon its 
face and unambiguous, and there is no fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior 
or contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add 
to or detract from the terms of the written contract.89 Further, the parol evidence rule is a 
doctrine of contract law which forbids the consideration of extrinsic evidence to contradict the 
terms of a written, integrated contract that the parties intend to be a final statement of their 
agreement.90 However, in the case of an ambiguous contract or contract term, parol evidence is 
admissible to clarify the ambiguity. 91 
In this case, there was not an ambiguous contract. The agreements, consisting of the 
Purchase Agreement, Operating Agreement, Promissory Note, Pledge of Security, and Deed of 
88 R., Vol. !I, p. 197, 1f 8, p. 199, ,r,r 14-15. 
89McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 ldaho 106, 11 l, 190 P.3d 925,930 (Ct. App., 2008). 
oo Id 
91 Johannsen, 2008 WL 4595248 at 3. 
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Trust, were written documents signed by the parties. The plain lanfo>uage of the Deed of Trust, 
Promissory Note, and Pledge of Security provide that the Losees, individually and collectively 
pledged the Lava Home as security for an amount of debt equal to $261,000. Nowhere within 
the documents was there any clause that the Deed of Trust would not be recorded nor that a lien 
wonld not attach to the Lava Home. Thus, information about what Idaho Company intended to 
do with the Deed of Trust and Pledge of Security after the signing is irrelevant. 
Yet, the trial court permitted Mrs. Losee to present testimony through her affidavit 
regarding alleged oral stipulations, agreements, or negotiations made prior to the execution of the 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust. Mrs. Losee asserted in her affidavit that prior to actually 
signing the "Note and Deed of Trust" she and her husband were told by Rigby that the 
documents were "merely for documentation purposes" and that the same "would not be 
recorded." She also stated that "(w]e were shown a document purported to show the advances 
made by Defendants [Appellants] to date. The Note we were asked to sign exceeded that 
amount. Mr. Rigby told us the extra sum was to cover additional advances." Mrs. Losee went on 
to state "Mr. Rigby told us he knew we were then refinancing our home and did not want to 
. " "ht! ,,92 mtenere wit mt process. 
The Losees, through the testimony of Mrs. Losee, were allowed to vary the terms of the 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust with extrinsic evidence, which is not permitted under Idaho 
law. It was error for the district court to allow or consider this parol evidence. 
92 R. Vol. II, p. 199,114. 
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3. Consideration. 
The Losees came to Idaho Company in the spring of 2004 to request additional funding, 
Idaho Company did not go to the Losees. 93 In fact, the Losees requested that the original credit 
line of$135,000 be nearly doubled. JoCarol Losee testified she was aware that the Losees were 
pledging their personal residence as security for the debt. 94 
In the context of evaluating the Losees' claim, it is important to remember that a good 
portion of the funds expended were utilized to construct a garage/shop building on the Lava 
Home. The building is substantial, and increases the value of Appellees' property. In addition, 
Appellants' Counterclaim, together with Rigby's affidavit, allege significant improprieties on the 
part of the Losees, including fraud, diversion of Sky funds for their own use and benefit, and 
mismanagement of company funds. It is also relevant that the $261,000 loan was made after 
serions mismanagement issues by the Losees came to light. It is certainly reasonable, as 
Appellants argued to the district court, that Idaho Company was reluctant to commit additional 
f1mds at that juncture, and was having second thoughts as to the viability of Sky.95 It is also 
reasonable, as Idaho Company further argued, that it would not have advanced the funds, absent 
the grant of security by the Lo sees. 96 
The additional funding provided by Idaho Company constituted consideration for the 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust under any standard, and was a modification to the original 
93 R. Supp., p. 13., 1[ 4. 
94R., Supp., pp. 83-85, p. 73, II. 11-19, p. 74, II. 4-25, p. 75, II. 11-14. 
95R., Supp., pp. 32-33. 
96 R., Supp., pp. 144-145. 
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contracts between the parties. This Court has held that "the doing by one of the parties of 
something that he is not legally bonnd to do co11stitutes consideration for the other's promise to 
modify the terms oftlle original agreement."97 Under the terms of the original agreements 
between the parties, Idaho Company was obliged to finance only $135,000 of Sky expenses. The 
Losees were not obliged to repay that amount. However, as JoCarol Losee testified, there came 
a time when $135,000 was not enough. She also testified that the garage/shop came to be an 
expensive facility. 98 Presumably, part of the reason the Losees agreed to sign the Promissory 
Note and Deed of Trust was so that the garage/shop could be finished, thereby enhancing the 
value of their property. Again, these are matters to be presented and evaluated at trial, so that 
factual questions can be fully explored and resolved. They were not matters that were ripe for 
summary judgment at the time the district court made its determination. 
The July 2004 agreements met all oftlle tests for mutuality of obligation. It is a well-
established principle of contract law that "contracts do not necessarily give identical rights to all 
parties. That is part of tlle bargaining process."99 Whether or not the trial court, with the scant 
evidence before it, believed the July 2004 agreements were fair or unfair, or were a good or bad 
bargain for the Losees, could not be grounds for a grant of summary judgment, given the 
enom1ity of the disputed facts in this case. The district court erred in granting partial summary 
judgment in favor of the Losees. 
"Great Plains Equip., Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754,769,979 P.2d 627,642 (1998). 
98R., Supp., pp. 83-85. 
99Doughty v. Idaho Frozen Foods Corp., 1!2 ldaho 791, 794, 736 P.2d 460,463 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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E. The District Court Failed to Support its Judgment with Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
In rendering an opinion, the trial court issued an extremely short three paragraph ruling 
which stated rather simply "[a]fter reviewing the file, briefs, memorandums, affidavits, 
pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment." 100 The trial court failed to indicate what facts were so clear and 
uncontroverted as to preclude a trial; indeed, it did not make any findings of fact at all. Neither 
did the trial court clearly explain any basis for its. ruling, other than a general statement that it 
had looked at all the pleadings and other papers within its file. 
While there is no requirement under LR. C.P. 56 which mandates that an order of 
summary judgment must contain findings of fact and a conclusion oflaw, 101 Rule 56 does 
require, as a practical matter, that the trial court must have considered all material facts, and 
found, after looking at all facts in deference to the non-moving party, that no genuine issue of 
material fact existed and, as a matter of law, the claimant was entitled to sununary judgment. 
Where no findings of fact nor conclusions of law were made in this matter and only a simple 
reference to the materials reviewed was given, there is a lack of support for any supposition that 
the trial court in this case perceived any material facts and then subsequently found that there 
was no genuine issue of those material facts. Indeed, the order from the trial court does not even 
state in the barest of terms that 'there is no genuine issue of material fact'. Without such a 
100 R., Vol. II, p. 297. 
101 Bank of Idaho v. Nesseth, 104 Idaho 842, 664 P.2d 270 (1983), findings ordinarily are optional, not 
mandatory, when rendering a summary judgment. 
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determination, there is no way for this Court standing in review to evaluate whether the trial 
court properly reached its conclusions by an exercise of reason. Appellants submit that it did 
not. 
F. Appellants Should Be Awarded Their Attorneys Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Attorneys fees and costs are specifically provided for in the Deed of Trust, Promissory 
Note and Security Agreement, and should be awarded to Appellants pursuant to the contract 
between the parties. 102 
In the alternative, Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 
LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. It is well-established law before this Court "that LC. §12-120 
mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial." 103 In 
this case, the Appellees brought two unsuccessful motions for remand, which were frivolous, 
unreasonable and without foundation. 104 In addition, Appellees' motion for summary judgment 
was based upon Mrs. Losee's affidavit testimony, which is in direct opposition to her previous 
sworn testimony. Appellants should be awarded their reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
incurred in this appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The core problem with this case is that was that it was not an appropriate candidate for 
summary judgment from the outset. Appellees failed to furnish the trial court with even the most 
102 R., Supp., pp. I 9-30. 
103 Chavez v. Barrus 146 ldaho 212, 225, 192 P.3d I 036, 1049 (2008)., citing Cox v. Mulligan, 142 ldaho 
356, 359, 128 P.3d 893, 896 (2005). 
104 See Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 779, 186 P.3d 690,635 (2008); see also Gustaves v. Gustaves, 
138 Idaho 64, 57 P.3d 775 (2002). 
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basic outline of undisputed facts, and the affidavit they relied upon was contradicted by prior 
testimony of the deponent. The district court failed to recognize that nearly every material fact 
before it was in dispute. Instead, it apparently decided to go "behind the scenes" and weigh the 
evidence or determine credibility of witnesses, which is not permitted at the summary judgment 
stage. 
Appellants were entitled to have the facts construed in the light most favorable to them, 
as the nonmoving party. They were entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in their 
favor. The district court failed to do either. The grant of partial summary judgment in favor of 
Appellees should be reversed, and Appellants should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs 
on appeal. 
/ 
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